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UPDATE ON MODERNIZATION LEGISLATION
JOHN C. DUGAN*
I have been involved one way or another with the issue of financial
services reform since about 1986. I like to tell people that, like Bill Murray in
the movie “Groundhog Day,” I feel doomed to repeat the same day over and
over again. Since 1980, eight of the ten two-year Congresses have considered
major financial services reform legislation. They’ve all had varying degrees
of progress, but they’ve all failed to get to the finish line for one reason or
another. The timing of this Symposium really is quite something. I think this
is the year, and I’ve said this before and have been wrong before, but I do
think this is the year that something quite significant will pass in Congress.
As was mentioned earlier, last week a bill was reported out of the Senate
Banking Committee. Just last night, a bill was reported out of the House
Banking Committee by an overwhelming bipartisan vote of fifty-one to
eight, which I think augurs quite well for the future of this legislation. All of
these proposals since the 1980s, or most of them anyway, have some
common elements. So, let me just take a minute to describe in a nutshell
what this type of legislation would do.
Basically it would allow the creation of a truly diversified financial
company, which means that a single company could engage in banking,
securities, insurance, and any other type of financial activity. Put another
way, and perhaps more importantly, it means that mergers would now be
permitted between a bank holding company on one hand, and a securities or
insurance company, or both, on the other hand.
To get to this result, the bill repeals or substantially modifies key elements
of the Glass-Steagall Act, the Bank Holding Company Act, and state law.
Why? Because all of these laws, in one way or another, restrict cross-
ownership and protect particular industries from competition. For example,
the Glass-Steagall Act was originally intended to separate securities
underwriters from banking institutions, and the Bank Holding Company Act
was set up and amended specifically in 1982 to keep bank holding companies
out of the insurance business. There are many complicated aspects of these
pieces of legislation, particularly the ones that are on the table today. Before
describing them, let me comment briefly on why I think it has taken so long
to pass this legislation and why I think its chances are greatly improved this
time around.
* Partner, Covington & Burling. J.D. 1981, Harvard Law School; B.A. 1977, University of
Michigan. This is a transcription of comments made orally at the Symposium.
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In the past, because of the very reasons I suggested, these bills were
passed to protect particular industries, and industries had a very big stake in
protecting their turf. For example, when banks decided that the securities
industry was very profitable and they wanted to try to dismantle the Glass-
Steagall Act, there was intense resistance from the securities industry as a
whole and from the mutual fund industry. And likewise, there was a great
deal of fighting that went on between the insurance companies and the banks
and the insurance agents and the banks. Congress generally finds it quite
difficult to act when industries are battling this way. There are too many
cross currents going on. It’s difficult to help one industry without hurting
another. That was always the problem in past efforts. One side would be seen
as getting a benefit at the expense of the other, and the legislation just never
could get across the finish line for that reason. To balance the interests of the
competing groups was something that could not be achieved.
In the meantime, as Congress has failed to act, the regulators have been
quite aggressive on a number of these fronts to break down some of these
barriers. At the same time, the market has been blurring a lot of distinctions
between the types of products, between banking products and securities
products, between securities products and insurance products, and between
derivatives and futures products. This blurring has driven an effort by
regulators to break down barriers to allow institutions to engage in all of
these products at once. For example, the Federal Reserve has acted under
section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act to essentially allow bank holding
companies to own a full service securities underwriting and dealing firm
provided that the firm limits its revenues from certain securities activities to
less than 25% of its gross revenue. The limit is in effect for a variety of
reasons that I won’t go into that involve very precise statutory words. But the
net effect, after starting out at 5%, moving to 10%, and then up to 25%, is
that today it’s possible for a Citigroup to own Solomon Brothers. That’s
perfectly within the law, and it starts to weaken what Glass-Steagall was
originally intended to do. Further, it shows that there is a driving force among
firms who want to do these kinds of combinations.
The same thing happened in insurance. The Comptroller of the Currency
has been very aggressive and has said that certain financial products,
annuities for example, are not really insurance products but are banking
products. And if they’re banking products, then banks can sell them. You
might think that when the National Bank Act said that a company could only
sell insurance in a town of under 5,000, it might mean that companies could
only sell insurance in small towns. But the Comptroller means that as long as
the company is in a place that has fewer than 5,000 people in it, wherever it
is, it can sell anywhere. And all of these rulings preempt state insurance laws
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that might say something to the contrary. As a result, insurance agents and
securities firms start to think that the handwriting is on the wall. Pretty soon
the debate becomes less a question of whether we should reform these laws
and rationalize the system, but instead how we should do it. Gradually, there
have been more and more compromises reached among the competing
industries so that right now, as I’ll discuss in a minute, most of the industries
have lined up in favor of moving forward, not just with the general concept
of legislation that allows everybody to be in each other’s business, but in
very specific ways that people have begun to agree on, thus taking
competitive issues off the table. So that’s one, probably the major factor,
that’s allowing Congress to act and ratify and rationalize something that’s
already going on out in the marketplace and already going on in the current
regulatory scheme.
A second reason I’m optimistic this time around is that we’ve never had
the two Chairmen of the House and Senate Banking Committees make this a
priority at the very beginning of a Congress. This time we have the entire
congressional two-year cycle to try to get this legislation passed. The result is
that there are only a few really major issues still outstanding. Are they
serious issues? Yes, they are. They certainly could derail this legislation. But
because the industry is so anxious to get a bill and so much in agreement in
the type of bill that ought to be done, I think that it will get done before the
end of this Congress.
I should stop and make one aside. People often try to call this just a
financial services bill, but it really is related to banks. This bill doesn’t affect
financial companies that get together without a bank in their structure. What
causes all the regulation, issues, and debate is when a company owns a
bank—because the bank has the federal deposit insurance guarantee, the
access to the discount window, and the access to the payment system. This
creates the need for regulation that is at the heart of the legislative reform
efforts.
Chart I shows the current structure for bank holding company regulation.
The holding company itself is regulated by the Fed, and underneath this, in
the middle, is a national bank. (It could also be a state bank.) The bank is
allowed to engage in banking activities, obviously, but it also is able to
engage in certain bank eligible securities activities inside the bank. On the
west side, you see that section 20 companies can engage in some securities
activities but not all securities activities. There are firewalls that are put in
place between the two. On the other side of the bank, the east side, you see
“closely related” financial activities, which include things like mortgage
banking and credit card activities. But it does not include merchant banking
Washington University Open Scholarship
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or equity investments in companies of the kind that investment banks make;
and it doesn’t allow insurance activities or any other type of financial
activities. Finally, it most certainly doesn’t allow commercial activities.
Finally, underneath the national bank, you see what things are permitted
in subsidiaries. It used to be that traditional operating subsidiaries were all
that was permitted for national banks and that they could do only what the
bank itself could do. Now the Comptroller has allowed subsidiaries to engage
in activities that are not permissible for the bank itself to engage in, such as
underwriting municipal revenue bonds, and, possibly, other securities, and
insurance.
That is the current basic structure, and because it’s set up this way, and
because of the limits on insurance, securities, and other financial activities, it
prohibits mergers of an insurance company with a bank holding company,
for example. Companies just couldn’t do that under current law, except under
limited circumstances. It is possible under the new limits for big securities
firms and banks to affiliate, but it is not completely possible for all securities
firms and for all bank holding companies to merge. The 25% limit is still a
significant restriction of sorts.
Chart II shows H.R. 10 as it was introduced in the House. It is not the bill
that was marked up last week in the Senate Banking Committee, and it is not
exactly the same bill that was marked up in the House Banking Committee,
but it is close enough for purposes of what I am describing today. As you can
see, compared to the previous Chart, there are far fewer prohibited
affiliations. It is now possible for a holding company to own a securities
affiliate that engages in securities activities without limits. It is possible to
engage in all financial activities through a holding company subsidiary. That
includes all insurance underwriting activities, all insurance agency activities,
and merchant banking investments in companies. And there are some
grandfathering provisions for financial holding companies to keep some of
their commercial activities on a one-time basis.
In addition, the bill contains provisions with respect to operating
subsidiaries. This version limited the operating subsidiary to agency activities
that were not widely permissible for a bank. But that is not what the House
and Senate Banking Committees recently provided. The House Banking
Committee would allow operating subsidiaries to engage in any activity that
affiliates can engage in, that is, full securities underwriting and any other
kind of financial activity except for insurance underwriting and real estate
development. The Fed favors a more restrictive version.
That’s basically the concept. If the legislation passes, mergers among
bank holding companies, insurance companies, and securities firms could
proceed. But these are the types of rules that the companies would have to
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol77/iss2/9
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play by. Most of the major issues that have arisen over the years have been
solved; a few are outstanding. I’ll discuss the resolved issues first.
The first is the Glass-Steagall Act itself and whether banks can engage in
securities activities. The bill allows full securities underwriting, and there is
no debate over that any more. The only issue in the securities area is whether
the bank itself can engage in the same level of bank eligible securities
activities that the SEC tried to regulate with Rule 3-b9, which the courts
struck down fifteen years ago. That’s a big area of debate in the Committee,
and they have worked out some exceptions that look a lot like 3-b9. The SEC
is not happy about the number and breadth of exceptions that are in the bill.
The banks are quite happy about them, and we are not sure how that debate
will finally be resolved; that is, it is unclear which activities will have to be
pushed out of the bank and which can stay in the bank. But that will not hold
up this bill.
I mention this issue because it is a good example of what Howell Jackson
described in his essay.1 The issue is not just that banks engage in securities
activities, and that the SEC says that it ought to regulate them. There is also
the question of who decides whether it is a banking activity or a securities
activity to begin with. The SEC maintains that it should have the sole
discretion to define “securities activity,” and the bank regulators say just the
opposite. It’s a big fight in Congress, and the House Banking bill has an
elaborate scheme to decide this sort of dispute between the SEC and the bank
regulators. In essence, the SEC gets the first shot at making the decision, but
if the bank regulators or an industry participant objects, the issue goes to
court. The court will then decide, giving equal Chevron deference to the SEC
and the bank regulators.
There are similar functional regulation issues in other parts of the bill. For
example, one area is insurance. The bill doesn’t permit a bank to underwrite
an insurance product. But there have been big fights between the insurance
underwriters and the banks regarding the definition of “insurance product.” Is
a standby letter of credit an insurance product? Is an annuity a banking
product or an insurance product? Again, the bill comes up with a set of rules
to settle such disputes. These are all real world examples of what Howell
Jackson described in his essay.
The insurance industry has been very effective in its lobbying, and it had
a hand in killing every prior version of this bill. In particular, the insurance
agents always had enough power to get a bad amendment or a restrictive
1. Howell E. Jackson, Regulation in a Multisectored Financial Services Industry: An
Exploratory Essay, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 319 (1999).
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amendment put on a bill, but they never had enough power to take that
restrictive version and pass it into law. This time around they have seen the
handwriting on the wall. About three years of work has produced a
compromise between insurance agents and banks regarding the regulation of
bank insurance activities conducted by national banks. It is an incredibly
complicated and cumbersome provision, but both sides have shaken hands on
it. It is now in both the Senate and House Banking bill.
Another issue that has been on the table is whether the bill’s new kind of
financial holding company could own a commercial firm, either without limit
or perhaps capped to investments constituting no more than 5% or 25% of
the holding company’s total assets or revenues. There have been various
proposals about this over the years. Neither bill permits such commercial
investments, at least not directly; they are not allowed to happen. General
Motors can’t buy a bank, and a bank can’t buy General Motors. But there is
some flexibility as to what is considered “financial.” Under the merchant
banking provision in the bill, a financial holding company can take
controlling equity interests in nonfinancial companies under certain
circumstances. That starts to look like a connection between banking and
commerce, but such investment activities are really very different. Why?
Because such investments would not be integrated in to the structure of the
holding company’s business. The investment is made for investment profit,
but it is not something that is cross-marketed with the products of the
financial holding company.
On the regulatory side, in previous bills there have always been questions
about whether there would be holding company regulation and who would
administer it. That, too, has been decided; the Federal Reserve will regulate
the holding company. People have agreed to that. They have made
adjustments nicknamed “Fed Light”; I’m not sure how light it is. Some
people call it “Fed Dark.” But the fact of the matter is that this issue is
basically settled now. The Federal Reserve will be the holding company
regulator just as it is today for bank holding companies. Such Fed regulation
once was anathema to the nonbanking companies, but they all seem to have
bought into the concept in the last several years.
Similarly, on this question of regulation, there has been an issue of what
happens to thrift institutions (which are not on this Chart). A lot of people
had thought thrifts now look so much like banks that they should just be
forced to become banks. That’s not going to happen. The thrift industry has
gotten healthy enough again to defend itself, and as a result, both bills now
allow commercial companies to own the current universe of thrifts. No new
diversified unitary thrift holding companies can be created, however. In the
meantime thrifts that are not diversified can still be created and still be
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol77/iss2/9
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subject to a separate regulatory scheme governed by the Office of Thrift
Supervision. That’s pretty much settled. There was an effort in the Banking
Committee yesterday to roll them all in to the bank holding company
structure, but the vote went the other way. It would have allowed anybody to
continue to have a commercial company owning a thrift.
Finally, we come to the question of functional regulation and who gets to
regulate what. This has pretty much been sorted out except in the securities
area, as I noted earlier. When the bill gets to the Commerce Committee,
where John Dingell and other people very friendly to the SEC still sit, there
will be some discussion about the “push-out” of securities activities, but
basically the issues have been decided as well.
All together, the bill out of the two Banking Committees is supported
very widely by the industry. But there are still three controversial issues that
have not been resolved and could still sink this bill.
The first one regards the operating subsidiary, and that is the question of
whether a subsidiary of a bank should be permitted to engage in the same
degree of financial activities that could be engaged in by a holding company
affiliate, even where the bank itself is not otherwise permitted to engage in
such activities. For example, banks are prohibited from engaging in full
securities underwriting, insurance underwriting, or real estate development
activities. The Federal Reserve has taken a strong position that an operating
subsidiary of a bank ought not to be allowed to engage in any of these new
financial activities. It has argued that there is a subsidy that attaches to the
banks that will leak to such subsidiaries; that the subsidiaries will thus come
under the safety net; and thus, that such a structure is inappropriate and ought
not to be permitted. The Treasury Department and the Administration have
argued just as strongly that firewalls can be erected to make a subsidiary no
different than a holding company affiliate with respect to any risk to the
bank. Further, the Administration believes it is important as a matter of
national policy for the Treasury Department to have a role in regulating these
new financial activities.
This is a very serious dispute, and last year it evoked a veto threat from
the President. It will evoke a veto threat again from the President this year;
that is quite clear. In a way, the Federal Reserve actually has more friends in
Congress than the Administration does. It sounds funny, but it’s true. On the
other hand, the Federal Reserve does not have a veto pen, which makes this a
difficult problem. In the last Congress, I think people sided almost uniformly
with the Fed, and even Democrats balked at the Treasury Department’s
position.
I would say that the trend is going away from the Federal Reserve and
towards the Administration in this Congress. The House Banking Committee
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has reported out a bill that the Administration now supports. The Senate
Banking Committee has not done so, but previous opponents of the Treasury
Department’s approach on the Democratic side in the Senate have now
embraced the operating subsidiary approach as well, or at least included it in
a substitute last week. I don’t know how that is going to play out.
I personally think that it’s going to be hard for the Federal Reserve to
sustain its position. The lack of the veto pen and the current momentum is
going to make it difficult. The Commerce Committee has traditionally
supported the Federal Reserve on this and is likely to do so again. So this
issue is by no means over. Nevertheless, the operating subsidiary issue is not
one that the industry cares greatly about. I think it is fair to say that, while the
industry would like the option of using an operating subsidiary, most don’t
really care—it is far more important that these new activities be authorized
than it is to be able to do them in operating subsidiaries as well as affiliates.
This whole issue really seen as either a “turf war,” or a policy issue and
debate, between the Federal Reserve and the Treasury Department. We’ll see
how that plays out.
The second outstanding issue, which I actually think is perhaps more
problematic for passage, is again not so much an industry issue as a
consumer issue. There is a big fight over whether the Community
Reinvestment Act (“CRA”) should be expanded in some manner as part of
this legislation or whether it ought to be contracted. Senator Gramm,
chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, is adamant that CRA not be
expanded, even in cosmetic ways, and indeed it should be contracted. That
suggestion is anathema to the consumer groups and to many Democratic
senators. It has also evoked a veto threat from the President.
On the other hand, although the Administration doesn’t want CRA
applied generally to nonbanking companies, it does support the CRA
provisions in the House bill. For example, in order to take advantage of all
these new activities, the House Banking bill requires banks to have CRA
ratings of adequate or better. That formulation has been pretty much resolved
in the House. But it has not been resolved in the Senate. The Senate bill, as it
came out of the Senate Banking Committee, contracted the application of
CRA. This evoked a veto threat from the President, and the bill was voted
out of the Committee on a party-line vote.
Senator Gramm feels very strongly about this, as do the Democrats, and
that could hold up the bill from going anywhere. On the other hand, a deal
could be struck; it could go to the floor of the Senate with things worked out
between the two parties. No one quite knows. That is one of the biggest
obstacles to this bill.
Finally, the third major issue I will talk about is something we also talked
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about this morning, and that is privacy. An argument is made that if you are
going to permit affiliations between all these new types of companies, it is
important to limit the sharing of information among these newly affiliated
companies. On the other hand, the industry argues that the reason for the
legislation is to view all of these companies as a single organization. The
industry wants to cross-market products and services of different companies,
and they worry about restrictions on their ability to share information.
I believe that, if there are too many restrictions, the privacy issue will kill
the bill. This debate had been in the background in the House Banking
Committee. Last week, however, it erupted. The House Banking Committee
almost put in a restrictive information-sharing or privacy provision. A
compromise was adopted that focused on required disclosures rather than
giving customers the right to “opt out” of, or “opt in” to, information sharing
arrangements.
That compromise won the day, although by a close vote. Once the
compromise passed, people calmed down. My prediction is that this is not
the last we have seen of the privacy issue. It will be redebated in the
Commerce Committee and, depending on how that comes out, could very
well affect the outcome of the bill.
Those are the outstanding issues. Such disputes did kill the bill at the end
of the last Congress, but that was partly because the compromises were not
reached until very late in the congressional session, with little time available
to pass a final product. Now these compromises have all been reached at the
beginning of a session, and we have a lot of time. The question is whether the
few remaining differences, which are large, can be worked out or not. I don’t
know the answer, but I think you now have the basic template.
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